Evolution of Russian Gas Supplies to the EU: Long-Term Trends from the Past into the Future (introductory remarks)

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Long-term trends and emerging challenges for natural gas within "Broader Energy Europe": multi-facet diversification as a trend and a driver of growing interdependence of Russia and the EU in gas (1/2)

1) <u>Dissolution of USSR/COMECON (1991+):</u>

=> two earlier connected neighbouring gas areas with DPs on the border became disconnected by a number of new sovereign transit states that appeared "above" DPs in RF-EU gas value chain

=> part of RF-EU gas value chain above DPs (in the zone of responsibility of producer/ exporter) became subject to legislative/regulatory activities of transit states => new risks & uncertainties for RF & EU

- 2) <u>Regulatory changes/challenges within the EU (1998=>2003=>2009-2017+):</u> => from "point-to-point" to a "pool" gas system "below" DPs in RF-EU gas value chain => until 2004 new risks & uncertainties for EU only, not for Russia
- 3) <u>Geographical expansion of the EU (2004/2007+): DPs in RF-EU gas value</u> <u>chain have "moved" from EU border to inside EU:</u>

=> part of RF-EU gas value chain "above" DPs (in the zone of responsibility of RF producer/exporter) became subject to legislative/regulatory activities of EU importer
=> new risks & uncertainties for RF & EU

Long-term trends and emerging challenges for natural gas within "Broader Energy Europe": multi-facet diversification as a trend and a driver of growing interdependence of Russia and the EU in gas (2/2)

4) Multi-facet diversification on the importer (EU) and exporter (RF) side as respond to

new challenges, risks & uncertainties:

=> triggering effect for further diversification for both EU & RF of RF-Ukraine transit gas crises (Jan'2006 & Jan'2009)

=> Diversification as a way forward from

(i) individual country markets within European continent connected by cross-border pipelines, to

(*ii*) "Broader Energy Europe" based on/cemented by cross-border capital-intensive long-distance large-scale immobile gas infrastructure, to


(iii) Integrated Eurasian Energy market by further expansion of such infrastructure from/through Russia Eastward

=> growing long-term interdependence of countries united by such infrastructure

5) EU decarbonisation (COP-21 & EU New Green Deal) and its challenges for gas:

=> new risks & uncertainties for gas based on pre-determined & imbalanced perceptions in favour of (as if clean domestic) RES-electrons & against (as if foreign dirty) NRES-molecules
=> "Borchardt turn" (Jan'2018+) & "Three-step Aksyutin's pathway" (July'2018+) = window of opportunities for balanced approach, if based on "technological neutrality" principle
=> area for further Russia-EU cooperative efforts in gas decarbonisation => role of WS2 GAC

Russian gas supplies to Europe: zones of evolving new risks & challenges for existing supplies within Russia's area of contractual responsibility post-USSR time



Italic – non-EU countries; New EU accession states: <u>underlined</u> – since 01.05.2004, <u>underlined + italic</u> – since 1.01.2007; **Bold** – FSU states members of Energy Community; (A) – historical delivery points of Russian gas to the EU in LTGEC (changer title of ownership for gas); (B) – change title of ownership for pipe of Russian producer/exporter in RF-EU gas value chain

Russia-EU common interest & mechanisms for minimizing transit risks

• **Prior to dissolution of COMECON/USSR**:

 Delivery points at COMECON-EU border, de facto no transit within COMECON (de facto single area for gas export), producer/exporter had full operational control on gas value chain from wellhead to delivery point

• After dissolution of COMECON/USSR:

- New sovereign independent states between producer/exporter (Russia) and the EU => producer has lost control on transit part of gas value chain (from its border to delivery points) => transit risks => acts for exporter & importer
- To minimize transit risks for importer & exporter = **to diversify**:
 - For <u>importer</u> (transit + supply risks); multiple routes + sources of supply (EU GTM: 3+) + suppliers
 - Though different interpretation of the term "diversification": any one facet or all three simultaneously
 - For <u>exporter</u> (transit + demand risks); multiple routes + markets + importers
- => diversification of routes = common interest for producer/exporter & importer => to exclude transit totally or alternative pipelines (by-passes)

Direction of logical chain in development of transit risks **bottom-up** approach: *the* name of the transit country is the *element of last* importance in the logical chain

Change in Level 3 political relations between transit states and its neighbors that can create interruptions of supplies through transit state

Technical component (adequate maintenance of transit system to provide technical stability and reliability of transit)

Legal (third country sovereign law), regulatory (adequacy of legal transit regime to fulfillment of supply obligations between parties to LTGEC from third countries), and contractual component to exclude appearance of "contractual mismatch" problem

A.Konoplyanik, 34 WS2 GAC, 23.04.2021

This author's vision of the nature and three major components of transit risk in the cross-border gas value chain

Level 2

For examples, see reserve slides

Level 1

Multi-facet diversification of **EU gas: increasingly multiple** sources of supplies, types of gas, routes & suppliers


Der

North Sea Existing sources / producing countries :

Russia Domestic Sources North Sea Origin of natural gas in the EU internal market Russia North Africa LNG 21% Norwa Zukunftstrends: 36% Russi Further export routes for Russian natural gas domestic production LNG from other supplier countries to Europe LNG 23% LNG Additional interconnectors uni per (Qatar, Algeria, Nigeria, North Africa (CEE, Baltic Pipe, ...) Russia, Norway, USA, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago) Quelle: EU-Kommission (Projects of Common Interests) / eigene Quellen: bestehende Hauptleitungen Source: Dr. Christopf Schäfers, Uniper. Security of Supply: Role of Natural Gas and Quelle: EU Kommission, Quarterly report on European Hydrogen" // Presentation at IBC Energy Committee meeting, 20.04.2021, online. ras markets / IHS Markit, EU 27 Daten in 202

Further diversification of supply countries and more interconnectors

Russian gas protects its competitive market niche at EU gas market in permanent competition with (i) EU domestic supplies, (ii) two other import EU supply sources of pipeline gas, (iii) further diversification of supply sources & pipeline routes to EU, & (iv) increasingly multiple LNG supplies from global LNG market A.Konoplyanik, 34 WS2 => Russia protects it market niche at EU market within increasing global competition GAC, 23.04.2021




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Two rings for future European gas supplies in formation: (i) "disruptive" ring of global LNG supplies & (ii) "integral" with internal backup ring of Russian pipeline gas supplies within radial-circle gas infrastructure system (generalized scheme)


-> Europe for Russian pipeline gas supplies = target market

-> Europe for LNG supplies (incl. US LNG) = closing (bridge) market within arbitrage deals (but target market for US LNG in Eastern Europe => "to kill the competitor")

Source: A.Konoplyanik








How LNG supply ring is aimed to be closed in the Eastern part of Europe


LNG and Ukraine – "Northern direction"





LNG and Ukraine – "Southern direction"





Source: Sergii MAKOGON (CEO of Gas TSO of Ukraine, LLC). GTSOU presentation. Overview. // Presentation at webinar "Ukrainian Gas Storage Opens for Business", LNG-Worldwide Ltd, DMG-events/World LNG & Gas Series, 10 June 2020

Gas business – long-term adaptability to new challenges


- Gas business has been effectively adapting to the new risks, uncertainties and challenges through many decades of its existence:
 - In more distant past to geopolitical challenges,
 - In more recent past to regulatory challenges,
 - Nowadays & in the coming future to decarbonisation challenges,
 - In the longer-term future ???
- Gas business has always survived in competitive environment in the long-term
- Presentations on last 5 years reflect just a part of longer-term trends
 - Contracts and pricing (S.Komlev)
 - Electronic trading platform (Yu.Djachenko)
 - Diversification of Pipe Gas Export Routes (A.Miroshnichenko)
- GAC mission: "to diminish common risks & challenges to the tolerable level" (<u>P.Lowe</u>, DG DG ENERGY, Inaugural GAC meeting, Vienna, Oct'2011)
- <u>Yamani</u>: "[You should always] think long-term. Once you start thinking shortterm, you are in trouble because short-term thinking is only a tactic for immediate benefit"

Items for next WS2 GAC meetings – long-term development evolutionary trends into future decarbonisation path (natural gas to survive & find its competitive niche within new types of competition - with both RES-electrons and decarbonized molecules)

Reserve slides


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Level 1 issue: Contractual Mismatch Problem




Mismatch between duration/volumes (D/V) of long term supply (delivery) contract & transit/transportation contract as integral part to fulfill delivery contract => risk of non-renewal of transit/transportation contract at **existing** capacity *or* non-creation of adequate **new** capacity => risk of non-delivery for existing/new **supply** contract (incl. arbitration consequences). **Core issue:** to guarantee access to/creation of adequate transportation capacity for volume/duration of long term contracts; **shipper's contracts (booking guarantees) best financial security for debt/project financing**

Level 2 issue: Technical conditions of Ukrainian GTS (acc. to KPMG)



There was a slight improvement in 2011, but since then the



(1) Ukraine: Calculated on the basis of number of failures (published by Ukrtransgaz, 2015) and 38.5 th km long transmission system and sum of transit and net imports from Russia were taken into account.


(2) EU average: Number of incidents per 1000 km from EGIG 2015 report and quantity of imports from Eurostat Statistical Dashboard.

(3) Germany: Number of incidents per 1000 km from DVGW 2011-2015 statement and quantity of imports from Eurostat Statistical Dashboard.

Source: Ukrtransgaz Publication on Incidents on the transmission system ("Y 2015 році кількість відмов на магістральних газогонах України зменшилась на 21%" Published on 2018.08.15), 9th Report of the European Gas Pipeline Incident Data Group on period 1970 – 2013 (2015); Sicherheit von Gasfernleitungen – das Technische Regelwerk im Licht der aktuellen Rechtsprechung (2011; 2013; 2015)

Source: Situation of the Ukrainian natural gas market and transit system. Market Study. // KPMG, 10.04.2017, p.37-38

Level 3 issue: Ukraine: "transit interruption probability" index (2009–2015)



Calculated by M.Larionova, Russian Gubkin State Oil & Gas University, Chair "International Oil & Gas Business", Master's programme 2013-2015, on methodology, jointly developed with A.Konoplyanik, based on principles of credit ratings evaluation by major international credit agencies

Thank you for your attention!

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